Iran P5+1 Nuclear Negotiations and Outlook

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A decade of diplomatic frustration

- 2002 revelations of Iranian efforts, previously hidden, to master the full nuclear fuel cycle alarmed the world
- A year later, Tehran agreed to suspension of uranium enrichment & enhanced IAEA inspections
 - » Terms were renegotiated and broadened in 2004 as Paris Agreement
- In 2005, Tehran abrogated its commitments and resumed uranium enrichment
 - » Reflected deep-seated frustration with the return on the deal
 - » Decision commanded brought support across Iranian political spectrum
- For next 8 years, Tehran's nuclear calculus appears unchanged by diplomacy or coercion
 - » Diplomacy: 2005 referral to UN Security Council; 2006 decision by Bush administration; 2009 fuel-swap proposal; 2010 mediation by Turkey & Brazil
 - » Coercion: covert campaign vs. scientists; internet sabotage; sanctions

After 30 years, sanctions began to bite

- US measures date back to November 1979, with varied bases
 - » First measures initiated after Embassy seizure, then eased after hostages freed
 - » Racheted up significantly in 1983; 1987; 1995 / 1996

• 9/11 transformed US sanctions policy, slowly turned vs. Tehran

- » US designations of Iranian banks and other entities for WMD/terrorism
- » Reputational campaign waged to persuade businesses to leave
- » Shift in European response to extraterritoriality


Since 2009, sanctions have gone on steroids

- » Four UN Security Council resolutions, culminating in UNSCR 1929 (June 2010),
- » Subsequent US measures targeted Iran's refined petroleum imports; petrochemical exports; transportation and insurance; precious metals; Central Bank; autos; more
- » Follow-on measures from "like minded states" included EU assets freeze; ban on energy investments; crude boycott; ban on SWIFT access, precious metals trade

• Efficacy ensured by a constellation of factors, possibly unique

- » Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
- » 2009 elections upheaval and subsequent repression
- » Changing energy markets

Sanctions slashed oil production, exports



Iran's 2013 presidential election

- 2009 post-election upheaval and subsequent repression set low expectations for 2013 ballot
- Long-time power broker Rouhani ran a savvy campaign, benefitted from cross-factional support



- » Reformists banded together with traditional supporters of the Islamic system in final days of the race
- » Deliberate cultivation of youth, disaffected produced surprisingly strong mandate
- Regime is more stable today than in recent memory
 - » Rouhani's mantra is prudence and balance; he leads a national unity government which has moved carefully to avoid exacerbating Iran's debilitating factional competition.

November 2013: a breakthrough deal

- Rapid progress underscores
 two important realities:
 - » Washington's commitment to a diplomatic resolution
 - » Tehran's endurance has limitations
- Deal froze major aspects of Iran's nuclear program



- » More comprehensive confidence-building gesture than previously contemplated
- » First successful negotiations between Washington and Tehran since 1981
- These concessions came cheap; Iran received only modest sanctions relief
 - » \$4.2 billion in Iranian overseas assets repatriated
 - » 6-month holiday for petrochemicals, automotive sector
 - » Designations/enforcement of existing measures unaffected
 - » Sanctions relief has proven to be less rather than more than bargain

Stalemate at the first deadline (July 2014)

- Extension of the talks for four months prolongs process, nets Tehran \$2.8 billion in relief, but expectations lowered
 - » Khamenei delivers defiant speech formalizing red lines of nuclear establishment → insistence on maintaining current enrichment capacity
 - » US Sec State acknowledges that a formula for a final deal remains elusive
- Differences are technical, not a function of domestic politics
 - » Distance between the two sides on key technical issues was not unanticipated, but tended to be obscured by optimism attendant with early progress
- P5+1 cohesion remains strong but Ukraine, regional context intensify uncertainty
- Sanctions relief plans are part of the mix but do not appear to present a major obstacle

Scenarios

- (Another) November Surprise
- No Deal; Diplomatic Pause
- Diplomacy Craters; Military Strike
- Inadvertent Escalation

30 percent 50 percent 10 percent Wild card

Iran's no-deal sanctions exit strategy

Denial

- » Self-sufficiency
- » "Resistance economy"

Mitigation

- » Alternatives: condensate exports; electricity exports
- » Creative financing arrangements: local currency, barter, oil swaps
- » Reforms: TSP; privatization; revision of investment framework

Evasion

» Smuggling

Retaliation

» Threats intended to deter implementation of sanctions and/or raise the price of oil

Moral suasion

» Pharmaceuticals; airplane safety

Bandwagoning with Russia

Implications for Iranian Energy

- Sanctions create severe limitations on financing, technology
- Tehran has quietly boosted output exports under interim deal, but 2015 crude exports & revenues are subject to considerable uncertainty due to likelihood of new Congressional measures
- Technocrats, led by Oil Min Zanganeh, are back in charge, but political & technical challenges remain
 - » Aging oil sector generates massive gas reinjection needs, now in greater competition with domestic consumption and transportation needs
- Remaining foreign investors particularly China have hedged; domestic substitutes often merely Potemkin players
- Intensity of sanctions enforcement, together with problematic business environment and expectations of continuing external regulatory obstacles to trade and investment – continues to deter early movers
 - » Even best-case a deal will only entail gradual, reversible sanctions relief
 - » Little to no prospect of significant new change in accessibility for US firms